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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In a July 23, 2012 Consent Decree,1 the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA), acting through its Executive Committee and President 
Mark Emmert, imposed unprecedented sanctions on Pennsylvania State 
University (Penn State).2  This action apparently was taken in an effort to 
 
 *   Professor of Law and Director, National Sports Law Institute and LL.M. in Sport Law for 
Foreign Lawyers Program. I want to thank Aaron Hernandez, Marquette University Law School 
Class of 2013, for his research assistance in connection with this article.  
 1.  RODNEY A. ERICKSON & MARK A. EMMERT, BINDING CONSENT DECREE IMPOSED BY THE 
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND ACCEPTED BY THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE 
UNIVERSITY (2013) [hereinafter CONSENT DECREE], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/ 
100830988/NCAA-Penn-State-Consent-Decree.   
 2.   Tony Hanson & Oren Libermann, NCAA Announces Unprecedented Sanctions Against Penn 
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convincingly demonstrate presidential control of intercollegiate athletics 
after recent widely reported scandals involving violations of NCAA 
amateurism, academic integrity, and ethical conduct rules by persons 
associated with high-profile intercollegiate football programs, including the 
University of Southern California, the Ohio State University, the University 
of North Carolina, and the University of Miami.3  Based solely on the 
findings and conclusions of the July 12, 2012 “Freeh Report”4 and the June 
22, 2012 criminal conviction of former Penn State assistant football coach 
Gerald Sandusky of serial child sexual abuse, the NCAA coerced Penn State 
into accepting draconian institutional sanctions, including a $60 million fine, 
a four-year ban on any postseason football games, a significant reduction of 
football scholarships over a four-year period, and vacation of 112 football 
wins from 1998–2011.5  It also required Penn State to waive its rights “to a 
determination of violations by the NCAA Committee on Infractions, any 
appeal under NCAA rules, and any judicial process.”6 
This unprecedented use of de facto “best interests” power to punish a 
member university for individual criminal activity and institutional 
misconduct which “ordinarily would not be actionable by the NCAA”7 and 
which was unilaterally imposed outside of its customary rules enforcement 
and disciplinary procedures violated Penn State’s contractual due process 
rights and private association law as well as possibly federal antitrust law 
and state common law restraint of trade laws.8  However, it is unlikely that 
any of the provisions of the Consent Decree, which effectively punishes 
thousands of innocent parties associated with Penn State, including its 
football players, students, faculty, administrators, alumni, and fans, will be 
judicially invalidated.9  Thus far, Penn State’s Board of Trustees and current 
president have chosen to abide by its terms rather than contest any of them 
 
State, CBS PHILLY (July 23, 2012, 3:20 PM), http://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2012/07/23/penn-
state-community-awaits-ncaa-decision-on-football-program/. 
 3.  See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 4.  FREEH SPORKIN & SULLIVAN, LLP, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COUNSEL 
REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY RELATED TO THE CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE COMMITTED BY GERALD A. SANDUSKY (2012) [hereinafter FREEH REPORT], 
available at http://progress.psu.edu/assets/content/REPORT_FINAL_071212.pdf. 
 5.  See infra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 6.  CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 2.  
 7.  Id. at 4.  
 8.  See infra Part III–IV. 
 9.  Id. 
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in litigation.  A Pennsylvania federal district court dismissed a parens patriae 
antitrust suit filed by Governor Thomas Corbett on behalf of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s natural citizens, which sought to enjoin 
the Consent Decree from being enforced.10  Another pending suit on behalf 
of former Penn State football coach Joe Paterno’s estate and others asserts, 
inter alia, that the NCAA breached its contractual obligations and exceeded 
its authority, but none of the plaintiffs have authorization or standing to 
assert any claims on behalf of Penn State for injunctive relief against 
enforcement of the Consent Decree.11 
Initially, I will describe the background and chronology of events giving 
rise to the Penn State Consent Decree.12  Next, I will analyze Penn State’s 
potential breach of contract and violation of law of private association 
claims and consider the similar claims brought by the Paterno estate and 
others.13  Thereafter, I will review Pennsylvania Governor Corbett’s 
unsuccessful parens patriae federal antitrust suit and consider Penn State’s 
potential antitrust claims.14 
II.  BACKGROUND AND CHRONOLOGY 
On November 4, 2011, Gerald Sandusky was indicted by a Pennsylvania 
grand jury on charges of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, aggravated 
indecent assault, corruption of minors, unlawful contact with minors, and 
endangering the welfare of minors; several charged offenses occurred 
between 1998 and 2002, when he was a Penn State football coach or 
emeritus professor with unrestricted access to the university’s campus and 
football facilities.15  Two days later, Penn State Senior Vice President of 
Finance and Business Gary C. Shultz and Athletic Director Timothy M. 
Curley were charged with failure to report child abuse and perjury; Curley 
was also placed on administrative leave while Schultz stepped down.16  On 
 
 10.  See infra Part IV.A.  
 11.  See infra Part III. 
 12.  See infra Part II. 
 13.  See infra Part III. 
 14.  See infra Part IV. 
 15.  See Mark Scolforo & Genaro C. Armas, Jerry Sandusky, Former Penn State Coach Accused 
of Molesting Boys, Barred From Campus, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Nov. 6, 2011, 12:23 PM), 
http://www.freep.com/article/20111106/NEWS07/111060648/Jerry-Sandusky-former-Penn-State-
coach-accused-molesting-boys-barred-from-campus. 
 16.  Sara Ganim & Jan Murphy, Penn State Athletic Director Tim Curley, VP Gary Schultz Step 
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November 9, Penn State’s Board of Trustees terminated the employment of 
President Graham Spanier17 and Head Football Coach Joe Paterno.18 
In a November 17, 2011 letter,19 Emmert notified Penn State interim 
President Rodney Erickson that “the NCAA will examine Penn State’s 
exercise of institutional control over its intercollegiate athletics program” in 
light of the November 5 grand jury indictment of Sandusky for serial child 
sexual abuse occurring in the university’s athletic facilities and allegations 
that university officials failed to take proper action despite their knowledge 
of this behavior.20  “[T]o prepare for potential inquiry” regarding whether the 
university violated any of several enumerated NCAA principles and rules 
regarding its duty to monitor and control its intercollegiate athletics program 
as well as whether there was any unethical or dishonest conduct by 
university employees in violation of NCAA rules (specifically, violation of 
character, integrity, civility, honesty, and sportsmanship obligations, or a 
failure to demonstrate positive moral values as teachers), Emmert requested 
that Penn State provide information regarding its policies and procedures to 
detect, prevent, and respond to sexual abuse of children.21  Although this 
letter provided notice that the NCAA might seek to hold Penn State 
institutionally liable for rule violations by its administrators and coaches and 
expressly stated, “universities are often held accountable in our infractions 
 
Down in Wake of Jerry Sandusky Scandal, PENNLIVE (Nov. 7, 2011), 
http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/11/penn_states_curley_schultz_are.html.  On July 
31, 2013, they were ordered to stand trial on these charges.  Allison Steele, Former Penn State 
Officials to Stand Trial, Judge Rules, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (July 31, 2013, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/national_world/2013/07/31/3-ex-penn-state-officials-will-
stand-trial.html.  
 17.  Mark Viera, Paterno Is Finished at Penn State, and President Is Out, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/10/sports/ncaafootball/-joe-paterno-and-graham-spanier-
out-at-penn-state.html.  Spanier was subsequently charged with perjury, conspiracy, and endangering 
the welfare of children and was ordered to be tried on these charges.  See Mike McQueary Takes 
Witness Stand, ESPN (July 29, 2013, 6:53 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-
football/story/_/id/9518784/mike-mcqueary-witness-stand-joe-paterno-said-penn-state-erred; Steele, 
supra note 16.  
 18.  Viera, supra note 17.  Paterno was not criminally charged prior to his January 22, 2012 
death.  See Jack Carey, Penn State Coaching Legend Joe Paterno Dies at 85, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 
2012, 3:01 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/story/2012-01-21/former-
penn-state-coach-joe-paterno-dead/52737230/1. 
 19.  Letter from Mark A. Emmert, President, NCAA, to Rodney Erickson, President, Pa. State 
Univ. (Nov. 17, 2011) at 1. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 2–3.  
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process for failure to meet them,”22 it did not indicate that any disciplinary 
action against the university would be taken outside of this customary 
process. 
In response, Erickson informed Emmert that Penn State planned to 
conduct its own investigation and requested that the NCAA defer taking any 
action until it was completed.23  Emmert agreed to do so based on Erickson’s 
agreement to share Penn State findings with the NCAA.24 
On November 21, 2011, Penn State’s Board of Trustees commissioned 
the law firm of Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP to investigate the alleged 
failure of university personnel to report and respond appropriately to the 
sexual abuse of children by Sandusky as well as possible occurrences of 
abuse on Penn State’s campus or under the auspices of its programs for 
youths.25  It was also asked to provide recommendations to better enable 
Penn State to prevent and more effectively respond to future incidents of 
such abuse.26 
On June 22, 2012, a Pennsylvania jury convicted Sandusky of forty-five 
counts of the criminal charges against him.27  Sandusky was found guilty of 
sexually abusing ten boys; some of these crimes occurred on the Penn State 
campus.28  He was sentenced to 30–60 years in prison, which is effectively a 
lifetime sentence given that he is 69-years-old.29 
The July 12 Freeh Report found a “total and consistent disregard by the 
most senior leaders at Penn State for the safety and welfare of Sandusky’s 
 
 22.  Id. at 1.  
 23.  Don Van Natta Jr., On Death’s Door: Inside the Negotiations that Brought Penn State 
Football to the Brink of Extinction, ESPN (Aug. 4, 2012), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/ 
id/8228641/inside-secret-negotiations-brought-penn-state-football-brink-extinction. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 4, at 8.  
 26.  Id.  
 27.  Joe Drape, Sandusky Guilty of Sexual Abuse of 10 Young Boys, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/sports/ncaafootball/jerry-sandusky-convicted-of-sexually-
abusing-boys.html.  In post-conviction media interviews, Sandusky continues to maintain his 
innocence.  See Genaro C. Armas & Mark Scolforo, Sandusky Speaks Again, Maintains Innocence, 
AP (Mar. 25, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/sandusky-interview-air-nbcs-today-show 
(discussing Sandusky’s interview on NBC’s Today show).  Acknowledging that his touching of the 
boys may have “tested boundaries,” he denies having any inappropriate contact that harmed or 
violated them and is appealing his conviction.  Id. 
 28.  Drape, supra note 27. 
 29.  Tim Rohan, Sandusky Gets 30 to 60 Years for Sexual Abuse, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/10/sports/ncaafootball/penn-state-sandusky-is-sentenced-in-sex-
abuse-case.html.  
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child victims.”30  It found that, despite knowledge of Sandusky’s sexual 
abuse of children in university athletics facilities, Sandusky was given 
continued access to Penn State facilities and affiliation with its football 
program and was not prohibited from bringing children on campus.31  The 
report concluded that “to avoid the consequences of bad publicity, the most 
powerful leaders at the University—Spanier, Schultz, Paterno and Curley—
repeatedly concealed critical facts relating to Sandusky’s child abuse from 
the authorities, the University’s Board of Trustees, the Penn State 
community, and the public at large.”32  Based on its conclusion that there 
was a “lack of centralized control” over Penn State’s athletic department33 
and “[f]or the past several decades, the University’s Athletic Department 
was permitted to become a closed community,”34 the report recommended 
that Penn State take numerous steps to “ensure a sustained integration of the 
Intercollegiate Athletics program into the broader Penn State community” as 
well as to improve its governance and to protect children in its facilities and 
programs.35 
Almost immediately after issuance of the Freeh Report, Emmert 
informed Penn State’s president that a majority of the eighteen university 
presidents on NCAA’s Division I Board of Directors (which historically has 
not had any role in rules enforcement) wanted to unilaterally impose a four-
year ban on its football program as institutional punishment for the 
foregoing misconduct of university personnel.36  This is a sanction the 
Committee on Infractions, which is empowered to identify NCAA rules 
violations and determine appropriate disciplinary sanctions, had no explicit 
authority to impose sanctions on Penn State because none of the university’s 
athletic programs had been found guilty of a major violation of NCAA rules 
within the preceding five-year period.37  Nevertheless, its imposition was 
 
 30.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 4, at 14.  
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. at 16. 
 33.  Id. at 131. 
 34.  Id. at 139. 
 35.   Id. at 129–44. 
 36.  Van Natta, supra note 23.   
 37.  Id.  NCAA Bylaw 19.5.2.3.2 permits the “death penalty,” which prohibits an institution from 
participating in an intercollegiate sport for a designated period of time, to be imposed only on 
“repeat violators” (i.e., institutions found guilty of a “major violation” within the past five years).  
NCAA ACADEMIC & MEMBERSHIP AFFAIRS STAFF, 2009–10 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL § 
19.5.2.3.1–.2 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].  A “major violation” is defined as a violation other than 
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threatened unless Penn State accepted the draconian terms of a “negotiated” 
consent decree and prevented them from being leaked to the media.38  Gene 
Marsh, an attorney hired by Penn State to negotiate NCAA sanctions and a 
former chair of the NCAA Committee on Infractions, characterized this 
threat as “the NCAA equivalent of a cram-down.”39  He also realized it 
would be futile to suggest that Penn State’s institutional liability and 
sanctions be determined through the NCAA’s traditional rules-enforcement 
process because “[t]heir minds were made up.”40  In order to avoid a 
potential multi-year ban that would have prohibited the university’s football 
team from playing any games, Penn State’s president was effectively 
coerced under severe duress into accepting the NCAA’s unilaterally 
imposed, harsh sanctions without informing and obtaining approval from the 
entire university Board of Trustees.41   
The July 23 Consent Decree requires Penn State to accept the findings 
of the Freeh Report, meaning “traditional investigative and administrative 
proceedings would be duplicative and unnecessary”; to acknowledge that the 
report’s findings establish the university’s violation of the NCAA principles 
and rules referenced in Emmert’s November 17, 2011 letter; and to waive its 
rights “to a determination of violations by the NCAA Committee on 
Infractions, any appeal under NCAA rules, and any judicial process.”42  It 
imposes the following “punitive” sanctions on Penn State: a $60 million 
 
one “that is isolated or inadvertent in nature, provides or is intended to provide only a minimal 
recruiting, competitive or other advantage and does not include any significant recruiting 
inducement or extra benefit.”  Id. § 19.02.2.1–.2.  This disciplinary sanction has been imposed only 
five times, generally in extreme cases in which an institution has committed intentional, severe, and 
repeated major violations demonstrating clear disregard for NCAA rules: University of Kentucky 
(no men’s basketball during 1952–1953 season); University of Southwestern Louisiana (no men’s 
basketball during 1973–1974 and 1974–1975 seasons); Southern Methodist University (no football 
during 1987–1988 season); Morehouse College (no men’s soccer during 2003–2004, 2004–2005, 
and 2005–2006 seasons); and MacMurray College (no men’s tennis during 2005–2006 and 2006–
2007 seasons).  Zac Wassink, Top Five Harshest NCAA Sanctions Ever, YAHOO! SPORTS (Sept. 23, 
2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/news?slug=ac-6202256. 
 38.   Van Natta, supra note 23. 
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id. 
 41.  President Erickson informed only Karen Peetz, the chair of the Board of Trustees, and 
members of the Board’s Executive Committee in order to avoid a potential media leak of the consent 
decree’s terms prior to its execution.  Id.; see also Don Van Natta Jr., Penn State Faced 4-Year 
Death Penalty, ESPN (July 26, 2012), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8199905/penn-state-
nittany-lions-rodney-erickson-said-school-faced-4-year-death-penalty. 
 42.  CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 1–2.  
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fine, “equivalent to the approximate average” of the annual gross revenues 
generated by its football program; a four-year ban on any postseason football 
games; a four-year reduction of football scholarships from the allowable 
annual maximum of twenty-five to a limit of fifteen with an overall 
maximum of sixty-five during this period; vacation of all 112 football wins 
from 1998–2011; and five years of probation.43  It also includes a “corrective 
component” requiring Penn State to adopt and implement all of the Freeh 
Report’s recommendations regarding university governance, administration 
of the university’s intercollegiate athletics program, and the protection of 
children, as well as to enter into an “Athletics Integrity Agreement” and to 
appoint an independent “Athletics Integrity Monitor.”44 
During the July 23 press conference announcing the disciplinary 
sanctions imposed on Penn State, Dr. Edward J. Ray, the chair of the NCAA 
Executive Committee and president of Oregon State University, stated that 
the “historically unprecedented actions by the NCAA today are warranted by 
the conspiracy of silence that was maintained at the highest levels of the 
 
 43.  Id. at 5–6; Van Natta, supra note 23.  In addition to the NCAA sanctions, the Big Ten 
Conference disciplined Penn State by rendering its football team ineligible to play in the Big Ten’s 
conference championship game and requiring the university to forfeit its $13 million share of 
conference football bowl revenues during its four-year bowl ban.  Colleen Kane, Big Ten Hands 
Penn State 4-Year Ban from Conference Title Game, CHI. TRIB. (July 23, 2012), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-07-23/sports/ct-spt-0724-penn-state-big-ten--
20120724_1_purdue-and-wisconsin-bowl-revenue-commissioner-jim-delany.  From November 2011 
to March 2013, Penn State has incurred an estimated $46 million in NCAA and Big Ten financial 
penalties, legal and consulting fees, and lost sponsorship, advertising, and licensing revenues as a 
result of the Sandusky child-sexual-abuse scandal.  Michael McCarthy, Sandusky Sex-Abuse Scandal 
Has Cost Penn State $46 Million, ADVERTISING AGE (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://adage.com/article/news/cost-penn-state-scandal-46-million/240488/.  Penn State’s brand, 
which was ranked in the top five most trusted brands in June 2011, was ranked last among 104 
NCAA universities measured nationally in January 2012, but it rebounded to number sixty-three in 
March 2013.  Id.  Penn State athletics-department revenues declined by almost $7.9 million during 
the 2011–2012 fiscal year, but, ironically, donor contributions to its football program nearly 
quintupled from $2.1 million in 2010–2011 to $9.7 million in 2011–2012.  Steve Berkowitz & Jodi 
Upton, Penn St. Athletics Revenue Fell by $7.9 Million in 2012, USA TODAY (Apr. 8, 2013, 10:56 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2013/04/08/penn-state-athletics-finances-2012-sandusky 
/2064641/. In the past two years Penn State’s merchandising royalties declined almost $1 million to 
$3.1 million from their July 1, 2010-June 30, 2011 peak of almost $4 million, which was prior to the 
Sandusky child abuse scandal.  Allison Steele, Penn State Caps, Other Items Continue Sales Slump, 
Phil. Inquirer (Aug. 23, 2013) http://articles.philly.com/2013-08-23/news/41437681_1_billieve-lisa-
powers-penn-state.  
 44.  CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 6–8; see also FREEH REPORT, supra note 4, at 129–44.  
Former U.S. Senator George Mitchell was subsequently appointed as the Athletics Integrity Monitor.  
Van Natta, supra note 23. 
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university in reckless and callous disregard for the children.”45  He 
explained: “[T]hese are extraordinary circumstances.  The [NCAA] 
Executive Committee has the authority to act on behalf of the entire 
Association in extraordinary circumstances, and we’ve chosen to exercise 
that authority.”46  Noting that the chancellors and presidents of both the 
Executive Committee and Division I Board of Directors unanimously 
supported these sanctions, Ray stated: “We have to reassert our 
responsibilities and charge to oversee intercollegiate athletics.  So the first 
question you asked is does this send a message?  The message is the 
Presidents and the Chancellors are in charge.”47 
President Emmert stated, “[t]his was and is action by the Executive 
Committee exercising their [sic] authority, working with me to correct what 
was seen as a horrifically egregious situation in intercollegiate athletics.”48  
He cautioned: “[O]ne should not conclude that this was an abridged 
enforcement process.  It was completely different than an enforcement 
process.”49  He acknowledged that the Executive Committee unilaterally 
imposed the sanctions on Penn State without any negotiation.50 
 
 45.  Edward J. Ray, Exec. Comm. Chair, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, Press Conference (July 
23, 2012) (transcripts available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources 
/Latest+News/2012/July/21207236 and http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resour 
ces/latest+news/2012/july/press+conference+q+and+a) [hereinafter ESPN Press Conference I]. 
 46.  Id.  An NCAA online publication subsequently cited NCAA Bylaw 4.1.2(e), which states 
that the Executive Committee is authorized to “[a]ct on behalf of the Association by adopting and 
implementing policies to resolve core issues and other Association-wide matters,” as the basis of 
authority.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 37, § 4.1.2(e); see also NCAA Authority to Act, NCAA (July 
23, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2012/July/ 
21207233.  Although Ray stated this was not an unprecedented exercise of this authority, which has 
been used in the past when a situation “was so extraordinary” it required action in individual 
instances, it does not appear the Executive Committee used this power to impose disciplinary 
sanctions for NCAA rules violations.  See ESPN Press Conference I, supra note 45. 
 47.  ESPN Press Conference I, supra note 45.   
 48.  Mark Emmert, President, Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., Press Conference (July 23, 2012) 
(transcript available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/resources/latest+news/ 
2012/july/press+conference+q+and+a) [hereinafter ESPN Press Conference II]. 
 49.  Id.  
 50.  Id. 
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III.  BREACH OF CONTRACT AND VIOLATION OF LAW OF PRIVATE 
ASSOCIATION CLAIMS 
A.  Penn State’s Potential Claims 
It was appropriate for the Executive Committee to use its broad, 
undefined authority under NCAA Bylaws section 4.1.2(e) to require Penn 
State to immediately take corrective action to prevent future harm to 
children,51 including implementation of the Freeh Report’s 
recommendations, entering into an Athletics Integrity Agreement, and the 
appointment of an independent Athletics Integrity Monitor.52  On the other 
hand, there were no then-existing “extraordinary circumstances” that 
justified its punishment of Penn State for misconduct that does not explicitly 
violate NCAA rules, punishment that was unilaterally imposed without the 
procedural safeguards of the NCAA’s traditional rules-enforcement 
process.53  At the time Penn State was coerced into agreeing to the terms of 
the consent decree, Sandusky had been convicted and imprisoned for his 
crimes,54 and Penn State officials who did not appropriately respond to his 
serial sexual abuse of children had been removed from their positions for 
several months.55  Although this was an unprecedented, horrific situation, it 
was very unlikely to be repeated (especially at Penn State), and, according to 
Emmert, the “Freeh Report is the product of an amazing . . . unprecedented 
degree of openness for any University that [he had] ever seen.”56  Thus, this 
unprecedented use of de facto “best interests” power to punish a member 
university violated Penn State’s contractual due process rights and private 
association law. 
 The “basic purpose” of the NCAA, a private association of more than 
1000 member colleges and universities,57 “is to maintain intercollegiate 
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an 
integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear line of 
 
 51.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 37, § 4.1.2(e). 
 52.  CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 6–8. 
 53.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 54.  See Drape, supra note 27. 
 55.  See Van Natta, supra note 23 (“Paterno, Spanier, Curley and Schultz were no longer 
affiliated with the university,”). 
 56.  ESPN Press Conference II, supra note 48. 
 57.  See About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ 
ncaa/about+the+ncaa (last updated Aug. 13, 2012). 
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demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”58  
NCAA member institutions are required to conduct their intercollegiate 
athletics programs “in a manner designed to protect and enhance the 
physical and educational well-being of student-athletes”59 and have the 
responsibility “to protect the health of and provide a safe environment for 
each of its participating student-athletes.”60  Another important objective of 
the NCAA is to “promote opportunity for equity in competition to assure 
that individual student-athletes and institutions will not be prevented unfairly 
from achieving the benefits inherent in participation in intercollegiate 
athletics.”61 
Although the NCAA has broad power to govern intercollegiate athletics 
in a manner that achieves these objectives and to discipline its member 
institutions for rules violations,62 there are contractual and other legal limits 
on its monolithic regulatory authority.  Courts generally require a sports 
governing body to comply with its own rules, provide fair notice of the 
conduct that violates them, follow the basic requirements of due process in 
its internal disciplinary proceedings, exercise its governing and disciplinary 
authority in a rational and consistent manner without any malice or bad faith, 
and comply with applicable laws.63  The NCAA is not subject to the 
requirements of the United States Constitution because it is not a “state 
actor,”64 but it must comply with federal antitrust laws.65  Regarding the 
scope of judicial review of NCAA disciplinary sanctions, a California court 
explained that “[t]he only function which the courts may perform is to 
determine whether the association has acted within its powers in good faith, 
in accordance with its laws and the law of the land.”66  
 
 58.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 37, § 1.3.1.. 
 59.  Id. § 2.2. 
 60.  Id. § 2.2.3. 
 61.  Id. § 2.10. 
 62.  See id. § 19.01.1 (“It shall be the mission of the NCAA enforcement program to eliminate 
violations of NCAA rules and impose appropriate penalties should violations occur.”). 
 63.  Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 544 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 
(1978); Cal. State Univ., Hayward v. NCAA, , 88–89 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); Bloom v. NCAA, 93 
P.3d 621, 628 (Colo. App. 2004). 
 64.  See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197–99 (1988). 
 65.  See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 66.  Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (quoting Smith v. Kern Cnty. Med. Ass’n, 
120 P.2d 874, 876 (1942)).  But see Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Reyes, 694 N.E.2d 249, 256 
(Ind. 1997) (“Absent fraud, other illegality, or abuse of civil or property rights having their origin 
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The NCAA rules-enforcement program’s mission is “to eliminate 
violations of NCAA rules and impose appropriate penalties should 
violations occur,” while being “committed to fairness of procedures.”67  The 
Committee on Infractions is responsible for administering this enforcement 
program, which includes fact finding relevant to NCAA rules violations, 
determination of rules violations, and imposition of appropriate sanctions.68  
An NCAA member institution has the right to be given notice of any alleged 
major rules violations as well as the opportunity to be heard before the 
Committee on Infractions and the opportunity to appeal its findings of major 
violations or penalties to the Infractions Appeals Committee.69  The 
institution may be represented by counsel of its choice in both proceedings.  
In all major infractions cases involving summary disposition (a cooperative 
endeavor between the NCAA enforcement staff and an institution that does 
not require a formal hearing that may be used only with the unanimous 
consent of the NCAA’s enforcement staff, all involved individuals, and the 
participating institution), the Committee on Infractions must review and 
approve the agreed upon proposed fact findings, rules violations, and 
sanctions, which are submitted in written form.70 
Under the general law of private associations, a necessary condition of 
judicial deference to the NCAA’s internal rules enforcement process as a 
private legal system is that it provides an appropriate level of express or 
implied contractual procedural due process (i.e., fair notice of the applicable 
rules of conduct and an opportunity to be heard before disciplinary sanctions 
are imposed for violations).71  Even if Penn State’s former president, vice 
 
elsewhere, Indiana courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of voluntary membership 
association.  This means, inter alia, that Indiana courts will neither enforce an association’s internal 
rules . . . nor second guess an association’s interpretation or application of its rules . . . .”). 
 67.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 37, § 19.01.1. 
 68.  Id. §§ 19.1, 19.1.3.  See generally Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions: Assigning Blame 
Where It Belongs, 52 B.C. L. REV. 551 (2011) (discussing the NCAA’s regulatory, enforcement, and 
sanctioning authority). 
 69.  NCAA MANUAL, supra note 37, §§ 19.4, 19.5. 
 70.  Id. § 32.7. 
 71.  Indiana private association law may not provide a legal remedy if a sports governing body 
does not provide contractual due process to its member institutions.  Reyes, 694 N.E.2d at 256 
(declining to recognize exception to general judicial noninterference rule for “association rules 
requiring due process”).  There is a potential Dormant Commerce Clause violation if state private 
association laws permitting broader judicial review of NCAA disciplinary action against its member 
institutions than Indiana law are applied to the NCAA, which is headquartered in Indianapolis. See 
supra notes 63 and 66 and accompanying text.  In Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004), 
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president, athletic director, and head football coach individually and 
collectively failed to act appropriately, responsibly, and ethically or violated 
applicable laws by permitting Sandusky to use university athletic facilities 
and to participate in university-sponsored activities as well as by not 
promptly reporting Sandusky’s alleged on-campus child abuse and criminal 
conduct, their conduct does not justify unilaterally imposed severe 
institutional sanctions without providing Penn State with a fair opportunity 
to be heard and defend itself before the NCAA Committee on Infractions, 
along with the right to appeal to the Infractions Appeals Committee.   
In the Consent Decree, the NCAA acknowledges that “[t]he sexual 
abuse of children on a university campus by a former university official—
and even the active concealment of that abuse—while despicable, ordinarily 
would not be actionable by the NCAA.”72  Nevertheless, based on the 
findings of the Freeh Report, “[t]he NCAA conclude[d] that [the] evidence 
present[ed] an unprecedented failure of institutional integrity . . . in which a 
football program was held in higher esteem that the values of the institution, 
the values of the NCAA, the values of higher education, and most 
disturbingly the values of human decency.”73  This created a culture in which 
“the fear of or deference to the omnipotent football program . . . enabled a 
sexual predator to attract and abuse his victims,”74 which was apparently the 
underlying basis of the NCAA’s decision to impose harsh disciplinary 
sanctions on Penn State. 
If the Executive Committee had not usurped the NCAA’s customary 
disciplinary process and coerced Penn State into admitting that it violated 
the NCAA rules identified in Emmert’s November 17, 2011 letter,75 the 
university could have challenged the Freeh Report’s findings and the 
 
the NCAA asserted that the application of Colorado’s private association law to resolve a student-
athlete eligibility dispute violated the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits direct state 
regulation of the interstate activities of national enterprises to prevent potentially conflicting and 
inconsistent state laws from inhibiting interstate commerce.  Because the court rejected the 
plaintiff’s claim on its merits, the court did not consider the Dormant Commerce Clause argument.  
Id. at 628.  See generally NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir. 1993) (invalidating Nevada 
statute requiring “any national collegiate athletic association to provide a Nevada institution, 
employee, student-athlete, or booster who is accused of a rules infraction with certain procedural due 
process protections during an enforcement proceeding in which sanctions may be imposed”).  
 72.  CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 4. 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id.  
 75.  See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text.  
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NCAA’s conclusions on these issues in a hearing before the Committee on 
Infractions.76  The testimony of key witnesses such as Gary Shultz, Timothy 
Curley, Michael McQueary,77 and possibly Gerald Sandusky (none of whom 
were interviewed by Freeh Report investigators) could have been introduced 
as evidence during this proceeding.  In addition, other evidence, such as the 
findings of the “Critique of the Freeh Report: The Rush to Injustice 
Regarding Joe Paterno,”78 could have been submitted for the committee’s 
consideration in determining whether Penn State violated any NCAA rules 
and, if so, the appropriate disciplinary sanctions.  
Despite the egregious nature of Penn State officials’ conduct and its 
inconsistency with the values of the university, NCAA, and higher 
education,79 it arguably does not violate any then-existing NCAA rules, 
whose primary objectives are to maintain and promote academic integrity, 
amateurism, and competitive balance as well as the health, safety, and 
welfare of student-athletes.  The NCAA does not have specific rules 
providing clear notice that its member institutions may be disciplined for the 
criminal80 or tortious conduct81 of athletic department employees that harms 
 
 76.  The Freeh Report concluded that Sandusky’s child abuse was concealed and not reported to 
authorities to avoid the consequences of bad publicity for its football program.  FREEH REPORT, 
supra note 4, at 14–16.  Arguably, the Committee on Infractions could have reached a different 
conclusion if it believed that Spanier, Shultz, Curley, and Paterno did not know that Sandusky was 
committing sexual abuse of children and simply were negligent in failing to investigate or take other 
appropriate steps to prevent this from occurring in Penn State facilities or in connection with its 
athletics program. 
 77.  As a graduate assistant for the Penn State football program, he witnessed Sandusky’s 
February 9, 2001 sexual assault of a young boy in the shower of the university’s athletic facilities.  
See Mike McQueary Takes Witness Stand, supra note 17. 
 78.  KING & SPALDING, CRITIQUE OF THE FREEH REPORT: THE RUSH TO INJUSTICE REGARDING 
JOE PATERNO, (2013), http://www.paterno.com/Resources/Docs/SOLLERS_FINAL_REPORT_2-9-
2013.pdf.   
 79.  At least one court has found that “‘specific and concrete’ promises contained in the NCAA 
manual” are legally enforceable.  Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 716 (D. Vt. 
2012).  Courts have held that merely general aspirational “ideals” and “goals” in documents defining 
the parties’ relationship do not create a legally enforceable compliance obligation.  See Ullmo ex rel. 
Ullmo v. Gilmour Acad., 273 F.3d 671, 676–77 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[A] breach of contract claim will 
not arise from the failure to fulfill a statement of goals or ideals.”); Gally v. Columbia Univ., 22 
F.Supp. 2d 199, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[T]he mere allegation of mistreatment without the 
identification of a specific breached promise of obligation does not state a claim on which relief can 
be granted. . . .  [G]eneral promises about ethical standards” are unenforceable.). 
 80.  The findings of the Freeh Report indicate that the failure of Penn State officials to report 
Sandusky’s on-campus sexual assaults of children to the proper authorities violated the “Clery Act,” 
a federal law requiring reporting and warning of crimes occurring on-campus, and Pennsylvania law 
requiring the reporting of child abuse.  FREEH REPORT, supra note 4, at 110–19.   
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or endangers others on-campus, or for the failure of university administrators 
to take appropriate action, including reporting to the proper authorities, if it 
occurs.82  Historically, the NCAA has not disciplined universities for failing 
to take effective steps to prevent the foreseeable crimes of athletic 
department personnel or student-athletes that injure other students (e.g., 
recruiting a student-athlete with a past history of criminal behavior).83 
The NCAA has not instituted disciplinary proceedings against 
institutions for recent tortious conduct associated with their athletic 
departments that results in the death of others (e.g., Notre Dame’s “serious” 
Indiana Occupational Health and Safety Act violation that contributed to the 
death of Declan Sullivan, a student-manager filming football practice during 
high winds84), or the deliberate indifference of a university’s head football 
coach to sexual assaults of women during on-campus recruiting of student-
athletes.85  The NCAA does not generally discipline its member institutions 
for athletic department personnel action or inaction that harms the health, 
 
 81.  The Freeh Report found that Penn State’s policies and procedures did not adequately protect 
children using university facilities or participating in university-sponsored activities, especially in 
light of Sandusky’s known inappropriate conduct, FREEH REPORT, supra note 4, at 120–26, which 
creates potential institutional tort liability.  See, e.g., A.B. v. Staropoli, 929 F. Supp. 2d 266, 275 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[W]here an infant plaintiffs [sic]  injuries are caused by the acts of a third party, 
the elements that the infant plaintiff must establish in order to prevail on a claim based on ordinary 
negligence in failing to protect him or her against alleged sexual assaults are ‘(1) that defendant was 
provided with actual or constructive notice that such assaults might be made upon the infant plaintiff 
so as to give rise to a duty to protect him [or her], (2) that defendant was negligent in failing to take 
reasonable protective measures, (3) that the infant plaintiff sustained actual injury, and (4) that 
defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of that injury.’”).  To date, several tort suits on behalf 
of Sandusky’s victims have been filed against Penn State—in August 2013, Penn State settled 
twenty-five cases with Sandusky’s victims, and other cases will reportedly be settled in the near 
future.  Colleen Curry, Penn State Settles 25 Suits in Jerry Sandusky Case, ABC NEWS (Aug. 26, 
2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/penn-state-settles-25-lawsuits-brought-jerry-sandusky/story?id= 
20069117. 
 82.  See NCAA Recommends Violation Structure: New Structure Will Adopt a Four-Levels of 
Violation for Infractions, NCAA (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2012-01-
13/ncaa-recommends-violation-structure. 
 83.  Mark Dent, Penn State to Receive NCAA Penalties Today, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 
(July 23, 2012, 12:03 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/state/penn-state-to-receive-
ncaa-penalties-today-645800/. 
 84.  See, e.g., Tom Coyne, Notre Dame and Indiana Reach Settlement in Declan Sullivan’s 
Death, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2011, 12:28 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/01/ 
declan-sullivan-death-set_n_888645.html; Tom Coyne, Notre Dame ‘Collectively Responsible’ for 
Declan Sullivan’s Death, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 18, 2011, 6:59 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/18/declan-sullivan-death-report_n_850539.html. 
 85.  See Simpson v. Univ. of Colo. Boulder, 500 F.3d 1170, 1184–85 (10th Cir. 2007). 
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safety, or welfare of student-athletes.86   
As a general rule, the NCAA has not traditionally disciplined colleges 
and universities for failing to comply with federal laws directly applicable to 
the operation of intercollegiate athletics such as Title IX, which requires 
equal athletic participation opportunities and benefits for both genders, even 
if there has been an intentional violation.87 
In comparison to recent cases in which the Committee on Infractions 
found that other institutions failed to monitor or control their intercollegiate 
athletic programs, persons whose conduct Penn State is responsible for did 
not violate NCAA rules that provide clear notice of well-defined obligations 
or prohibitions.  In the University of Southern California88 and The Ohio 
State University89 infractions cases, coaches failed to disclose known 
violations of the NCAA’s amateurism rules by student-athletes.  In the 
Baylor University case,90 a coach deliberately concealed his payment of 
impermissible benefits to student-athletes in violation of NCAA amateurism 
 
 86.  Given the NCAA’s imposition of severe disciplinary sanctions on Penn State, commentators 
have questioned whether the NCAA should discipline other institutions to be consistent with the 
precedent it now has established: 
 In an ongoing investigation, several Montana football players along with another man 
are accused of gang raping a fellow student.  In the Montana case, head coach Robin 
Pflugrad disciplined several players but didn’t report the incidents to his superiors.  
 Montana university president Royce Engstrom said in a statement “The University of 
Montana has determined not to renew the contracts of Athletics Director Jim O’Day and 
head football coach Robin Pflugrad.”  Then Engstron thanked both O’Day and Pflugrad 
for their service as he let them go. 
 The Department of Justice is investigating the university and campus police, along with 
the Missoula Police Department and the Missoula County Attorney’s Office for how they 
handle sexual assault allegations.  For three years the Department of Justice alleges that 
those listed above failed to investigate or prosecute numerous allegations of rape.  
 Now that the NCAA has opened the door, should they come down just as hard on 
Montana as they did against Penn State?  
Bryan Flynn, NCAA Has Opened Pandora’s Box Even If They Don’t Want to Admit It, JACKSON 
FREE PRESS (July 23, 2012), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/weblogs/sports/2012/jul/23/ncaa-has-
opened-pandoras-box-even-if-they-dont-wan/.  
 87.  See Glenn George, Title IX and the Scholarship Dilemma, MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 273, 281 
(1999); Pederson v. La. State Univ., 213 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 88.  COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2010), available at http://assets.sbnation.com/assets/639494/20100610 
_USC_Public_Report.pdf. 
 89.  COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NCAA, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS 
REPORT (2011), available at http://espn.go.com/photo/preview/!pdfs/111220/ohio_state_report.pdf. 
 90.  COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NCAA, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY PUBLIC INFRACTIONS REPORT 
(2005).  
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rules and induced some of them to lie to university investigators as part of 
this cover-up.  In the University of North Carolina case,91 a university tutor 
and several student-athletes violated NCAA amateurism and academic 
integrity rules. 
Despite having potentially meritorious breach of contract and law of 
private association claims against the NCAA, Penn State’s Board of Trustees 
ratified President Erickson’s entry into the consent decree, and the university 
has adhered to its agreement not to legally challenge any of its terms.92  
However, other parties, including the estate of Joe Paterno, have indirectly 
asserted similar legal claims on Penn State’s behalf in an effort to invalidate 
the NCAA’s disciplinary sanctions.93 
B.  Paterno Estate and Others’ Claims 
Although the Consent Decree did not impose any disciplinary sanctions 
on Joe Paterno, his family filed an appeal with the NCAA to invalidate the 
sanctions imposed on Penn State.94  They sought a hearing before the 
Infractions Appeals Committee “to redress the enormous damage done to 
Penn State, the State College community, former, current and future student 
and student athletes, Joe Paterno and certain others involved, as a result of 
the unprecedented actions taken by the NCAA.”95  Within about two hours, 
the NCAA vice president of communications responded by stating “[t]he 
Penn State sanctions are not subject to appeal” because the NCAA had not 
 
 91.  COMM. ON INFRACTIONS, NCAA, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHAPEL HILL PUBLIC 
INFRACTIONS REPORT (2012), available at http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/ 
pdfs/2012/university+of+north+carolina,+chapel+hill+public+infractions+report+march+12,+2012.  
 92.  PENN STATE, FACT SHEET ON PENN STATE NCAA SANCTIONS, available at 
http://progress.psu.edu/assets/content/120803_NCAA_Sanctions_Fact_Sheet_FINAL.pdf. 
 93.  Associated Press, Family of Joe Paterno Sues NCAA, ESPN (May 31, 2013, 1:45 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9325586/joe-paterno-family-others-penn-state-sue-
ncaa. 
 94.  Id.  By requiring Penn State to vacate all 112 football wins from 1998–2011, Paterno’s 
corresponding number of victories was reduced, which deprived him of the NCAA record for most 
Division I football games as a coach.  Michael Klopman, Joe Paterno Wins Vacated: NCAA 
Sanction Means Ex-Penn State Coach No Longer Tops Wins List, HUFFINGTON POST (July 23, 
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/23/joe-paterno-wins-vacated-ncaa-sanctions-penn-
state_n_1694731.html. 
 95.  Kevin Horne, Paterno Family Files Appeal Against NCAA, ONWARD STATE (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://onwardstate.com/2012/08/03/paterno-family-files-appeal-against-ncaa/ (quoting an official 
appeal letter sent to the NCAA by the Joe Paterno family challenging sanctions). 
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sanctioned Penn State through its traditional enforcement process.96 
Based on the “Critique of the Freeh Report” commissioned by the 
Paterno family,97 Joe Paterno’s estate and family (as well as five Penn State 
Board of Trustees members, four faculty members, two former coaches, and 
nine former football players) filed a lawsuit in Pennsylvania state court 
against the NCAA, Emmert, and Ray on May 30, 2013.98  In their complaint, 
plaintiffs allege that defendants “breached their contractual obligations and 
violated their duties of good faith and fair dealing”99 by penalizing them for 
Sandusky’s criminal conduct that “was not an athletics issue properly 
regulated by the NCAA.”100  They also circumvented the NCAA’s rules-
enforcement procedures, which “expressly protect and benefit students, staff, 
and other interested parties, recognizing that fair and proper procedures are 
important because the NCAA’s actions can have serious repercussions on 
their lives and careers.”101  The NCAA Executive Committee had no 
authority “to bypass or amend these procedures and impose discipline or 
sanctions on any member institution,”102 and the signing of the Consent 
Decree by Penn State’s president did not validly waive plaintiffs’ rights to 
these procedures.103  Plaintiffs assert that defendants’ adoption of the 
“flawed, unsubstantiated, and controversial [Freeh Report] that Defendants 
knew or should have known was not the result of a thorough, reliable 
investigation,”104 which was not approved by Penn State’s Board of 
Trustees,105 “effectively terminate[d] the search for truth and cause[d] 
Plaintiffs grave harm.”106 
 
 96.  Dennis Dodd, NCAA: Paterno Family Cannot Appeal Penn State Sanctions, CBS SPORTS 
(Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/blog/dennis-dodd/19721445/ncaa-paterno-
family-cannot-appeal-sanctions (quoting the Twitter account of Bob Williams, NCAA vice president 
of communications). 
 97.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 98.  Complaint, Paterno v. NCAA, No. 2013-2082 (Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas May 30, 2013), 
available at http://espn.go.com/pdf/2013/0530/espn_otl_State_Complaint.pdf.  
 99.  Id. ¶ 1.  They also allege defendants “intentionally and tortiously interfered with Plaintiffs’ 
contractual relations, and defamed and commercially disparaged Plaintiffs.”  Id. 
 100.  Id. ¶ 4. 
 101.  Id. ¶ 24. 
 102.  Id. ¶ 45. 
 103.  Id. ¶ 111. 
 104.  Id. ¶ 5. 
 105.  Id. ¶ 59.  “Nor did they ever accept its findings or reach any conclusion about its accuracy.”  
Id.  
 106.  Id. ¶ 5.  
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In summary, plaintiffs allege: “The NCAA’s unauthorized involvement 
in criminal matters outside its authority and purview ha[d] prevented 
interested parties from being treated fairly and ha[d] undermined the search 
for truth.  Instead of allowing the Freeh Report to be properly evaluated, the 
NCAA ha[d] crystallized its errors and flagrantly violated its own rules.”107 
In addition to compensatory and punitive damages, they seek a 
“declaratory judgment that the NCAA-imposed Consent Decree was 
unauthorized, unlawful, and void ab initio” and “[i]ssuance of a permanent 
injunction preventing the NCAA from further enforcing the Consent Decree 
or the sanctions improperly imposed therein.”108 
Regardless of the substantive merits of their claims, plaintiffs must be 
proper parties and have standing to assert them.  None of the plaintiffs, who 
collectively constitute current Penn State trustees and faculty members, as 
well as former coaches and football players, have a direct contractual 
relationship with the NCAA.109  Courts have generally held that only current 
student-athletes whose eligibility has been adversely affected by an NCAA 
ruling are third-party beneficiaries of the contractual relationship between 
the NCAA and its member institutions.110  Even if plaintiffs have standing to 
bring damages claims for individualized harm proximately caused by 
defendants’ alleged breach of contract or tortious conduct, none of these 
individuals have authorization or standing to assert any claims on behalf of 
Penn State and obtain injunctive relief against enforcement of the Consent 
Decree.111 
 
 107.  Id. ¶ 104. 
 108.  Id. ¶ 154. 
 109.  See Robert Wheel, How the Joe Paterno Lawsuit Against the NCAA Is Cynical, but Tactical, 
SB NATION (May 31, 2013, 9:57 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/5/31/ 
4381644/joe-paterno-lawsuit-penn-state-ncaa. 
 110.  See, e.g., Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 716 (D. Vt. 2012); Bloom v. 
NCAA, 93 P.3d 621 (Colo. App. 2004); Oliver v. NCAA, 155 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (2008).  The Consent 
Decree does not adversely affect the eligibility of current Penn State football players and it provides 
that “any entering or returning football student-athlete will be allowed to immediately transfer and 
will be eligible to immediately compete at the transfer institution, provided he is otherwise eligible.”  
CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 6. 
 111.  However, the Paterno estate may have standing to challenge the Consent Decree’s 
requirement that Penn State vacate all of its football team victories from 1998–2011 because this 
causes individualized harm to Joe Paterno’s reputation by precluding him from being recognized as 
the coach with the most Division I football game wins.  See Klopman, supra note 94. 
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IV.  FEDERAL ANTITRUST CLAIMS 
A.  Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s Claims 
On January 2, 2013, Pennsylvania Governor Thomas W. Corbett, Jr. 
filed a parens patriae antitrust suit on behalf of the state’s natural citizens 
against the NCAA,112 which sought to invalidate the Consent Decree’s 
disciplinary sanctions against Penn State and enjoin their imposition.113  He 
convened the grand jury investigation of Sandusky’s sexual child abuse in 
2009, when he was Pennsylvania attorney general, and is an ex officio 
member of Penn State’s Board of Trustees.114  His complaint essentially 
alleges that the NCAA violated Penn State’s contractual rights and the law 
of private associations, which it attempts to bootstrap into a federal antitrust 
claim under section one of the Sherman Act,115 which prohibits agreements 
that unreasonably restrain interstate commerce:  
 This suit arises out of the NCAA and its member institutions’ 
arbitrary and capricious application of their enforcement power for 
the purpose of crippling Penn State football, thereby harming 
citizens of the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] who benefit from 
a successful football program at Penn State . . . . 
 
 112.  Complaint, Pennsylvania v. NCAA, No. 1:13-cv-00006, 2013 WL 2450291 (M.D. Pa. June 
6, 2013), 2013 WL 20316, available at http://espn.go.com/pdf/2013/espn_otl_PennGovlawsuit.pdf. 
 113.  The filing of this lawsuit generated harsh commentary by some critics.  See, e.g., Rodney K. 
Smith, Column: Picking Politics and Football Over Education, USA TODAY (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/01/03/penn-state-ncaa-sanctions-sandusky-tom-
corbett/1805189/ (“Governor Corbett, on the other hand, clings to what may be a short-term 
politically correct commitment to the old win-at-all costs culture that has dominated big-time 
intercollegiate athletics for too long.  When rhetoric is replaced with reality, Corbett’s lawsuit is 
about whether winning on the field should continue to trump educational and student welfare 
concerns.  This is a game the Governor deserves to lose.”); E-mail from Michael Milillo, 
Schwenksville, PA, to Mark Emmert, President, NCAA (Jan. 9, 2013) (on file with author) (“The 
best response to Corbett’s lawsuit is to expel Pennsylvania State University altogether from the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association.  By severing all ties with Penn State, the NCAA can never 
again be accused by Corbett of overreaching its authority.  Nor can the NCAA be accused by Schultz 
of committing a criminal act.  If anyone should be held responsible for allowing Penn State football 
coach Jerry Sandusky to rape boys on the Penn State campus, it is Governor Corbett who refused to 
prosecute Sandusky for these insidious crimes against children while Corbett was the Attorney 
General.”).  
 114.  Shelley Ross, Why Does Gov. Tom Corbett Get a Free Pass in the Penn State Scandal?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 16, 2011), www.huffingtonpost.com/shelley-ross/tom-corbett-penn-
state_b_1093263.html. 
 115.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).  
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 . . . Penn State was forced to sign away its procedural rights, 
including an investigation of the charges against it, factual findings 
that NCAA rules were violated, a hearing before the NCAA’s 
Committee on Infractions, and an appeal of any adverse ruling.  
These punishments threaten to have a devastating, long-lasting, and 
irreparable effect on the Commonwealth, its citizens, and its 
economy. 
 The NCAA is a trade association of competitors, formed for the 
purpose of promoting intercollegiate athletic competition, in part 
through self-regulating its members to ensure fair competition on 
the playing field and the protection of participating student-athletes.  
While the antitrust laws permit such an association to impose and 
enforce rules or standards to promote certain procompetitive 
purposes, such rules must be reasonably related to those purposes, 
and must be enforced through procedures designed to prevent their 
arbitrary application. 
 The NCAA’s sanctions against Penn State fail to meet these 
requirements.  The NCAA has punished Penn State without citing a 
single concrete NCAA rule that Penn State has broken, for conduct 
that in no way compromised the NCAA’s mission of fair 
competition, and with a complete disregard for the NCAA’s own 
enforcement procedures.  In so doing, the NCAA and its members 
have forced Penn State to forfeit the valuable competitive 
advantages of full participation in the NCAA.116 
 
In Pennsylvania v. NCAA, the federal district court granted the NCAA’s 
motion to dismiss this antitrust suit.117  Initially, the court observed that 
“Penn State is not a party to this action and takes no position in this 
litigation”118 and that “the complaint limits [its] review to the question of 
whether [Governor Corbett] has articulated a violation of federal antitrust 
law.”119  For section one of the Sherman Act to apply to the NCAA’s 
 
 116.  Complaint, supra note , ¶¶ 2–5. 
 117.  No. 1:13-cv-00006, 2013 WL 2450291, at *15 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 2013). 
 118.  Id. at *1.  
 119.  Id. at *2.  The court noted that the “Governor’s complaint is an impassioned indictment of 
the sanctions against Penn State,” which he condemned “as ‘arbitrary and capricious,’ and 
personally motivated by a new NCAA President who was out to make a name for himself at Penn 
State’s expense.”  Id.  However, those allegations were “not the subject of the Governor’s claim for 
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challenged conduct, a plaintiff “cannot allege just any harm, but must point 
to harm directed at commercial activity of the type the Sherman Act is 
designed to address.”120  The court ruled that this requirement is not satisfied 
merely by the Governor’s allegations that the NCAA sanctions will cripple 
the ability of Penn State’s football program to compete on the playing field 
or reduce its ability to generate revenues for the university.  Because “the 
complaint is devoid of allegations that [the NCAA] sought to regulate 
commercial activity or obtain any commercial advantage for itself by 
imposing sanctions on Penn State,” the court held that the Governor’s 
allegations “do not make out commercial activity subject to the Sherman 
Act.”121 
Even if the NCAA sanctions are characterized as commercial activity 
and section one of the Sherman Act applies, the court ruled that the 
complaint did not sufficiently allege that the NCAA sanctions are the 
product of a conspiracy to achieve an anticompetitive objective and 
unreasonably restrain interstate commerce.122  There was no allegation that 
“Dr. Emmert, and unidentified members of the Division I Board of Directors 
and Executive Committee, agreed together to punish Penn State in an effort 
to achieve an unlawful purpose forbidden by the antitrust laws.”123  
Determining that the rule of reason would apply, the court noted that the 
Governor “bears the initial burden of demonstrating that the alleged restraint 
produced an adverse anticompetitive effect within the relevant geographic 
market.”124  It concluded that he failed to sufficiently allege that the Consent 
Decree sanctions reduced economic competition among NCAA institutions 
in the nationwide markets for post-secondary education, Division I football 
players, and the sale of college-football-related apparel and memorabilia.125  
The court also ruled that the Governor has no standing to assert this claim 
because Pennsylvania’s natural citizens are not consumers or competitors of 
NCAA institutions in any of these relevant markets and therefore did not 
suffer antitrust injury.126 
 
relief, and [were] not before the Court for a review on their merits.”  Id. at *3.   
 120.  Id. at *3. 
 121.  Id. at *8. 
 122.  Id. at *12. 
 123.  Id. at *9. 
 124.  Id. at *11. 
 125.  Id. at *14. 
 126.  Id. 
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 B.  Penn State’s Potential Claims 
Courts have uniformly rejected antitrust challenges to NCAA 
disciplinary action arising out of its traditional rules-enforcement process as 
a matter of law.127  For example, in Bassett v. NCAA, a coach who was 
sanctioned for NCAA amateurism and academic integrity rules violations 
alleged that “many coaches, including [himself], have been unfairly 
investigated or sanctioned through NCAA’s enforcement process that fails to 
apply the due process protections contained in NCAA’s enforcement 
process,” in violation of section one of the Sherman Act.128  The Sixth 
Circuit dismissed his antitrust claim because his complaint “contain[ed] no 
allegations of the effect of NCAA’s enforcement of its non-commercial rules 
on the coaching market” and did not “allege the [sanction] resulted from 
some anticompetitive purpose.”129  It rejected his contention that the 
“NCAA’s disciplinary scheme impacts commerce because the discipline 
involves financial sanctions” that effectively prohibited him from working as 
a college coach for eight years.130  Observing that student-athlete amateurism 
and academic eligibility rules are non-commercial in nature, the court 
explained that “[a]s long as the enforcement of non-commercial rules is 
reasonably and rationally related to the rules themselves, . . . enforcement is 
a non-commercial activity.”131  
Consistent with Bassett, the court in Pennsylvania v. NCAA held that the 
 
 127.  See, e.g., Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 2008) (dismissing antitrust 
challenge to sanctions imposed on coach for violating NCAA rules governing recruiting, improper 
benefits to athletes, and academic fraud); McCormack v NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(upholding one-year ban on institution’s participation in intercollegiate football for egregious 
violations of NCAA amateurism rules); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356 (D. Ariz. 1983) 
(rejecting antitrust challenge to two-year ban on university football team’s postseason and television 
appearances because staff members and representatives of its football program violated NCAA 
amateurism rules).  See also Hairston v. Pac-10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(upholding athletic conference sanctions, including two-year bowl ban, one-year television revenue 
ban, and scholarship limitations imposed on member school for player recruiting violations).  
 128.  528 F.3d 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 129.  Id.; cf. Blalock v. Ladies Prof’l Golf Ass’n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1268 (N.D. Ga. 1973) 
(holding that the one-year suspension of a professional golfer for alleged rules violations by a 
governing board solely composed of competing tour players constituted “a completely unfettered, 
subjective and discretionary determination of an exclusionary sanction by a tribunal wholly 
composed of competitors” for their own potential financial benefit, which infringed upon her right to 
a fair disciplinary hearing in violation of federal antitrust laws). 
 130.  Basset, 528 F.3d at 431. 
 131.  Id. at 433. 
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adverse effects of NCAA sanctions on Penn State’s ability to compete on the 
football field with other universities and generate revenues does not 
constitute the requisite antitrust injury caused by anticompetitive 
commercial activity.132  The Seventh Circuit (whose law governs Indiana, 
where the NCAA is headquartered) views the scope of the NCAA’s 
commercial activity subject to antitrust scrutiny more broadly than the 
Pennsylvania v. NCAA district court, applying Third Circuit law.133  
Nevertheless, in Agnew v. NCAA,134 the Seventh Circuit confirmed that an 
antitrust plaintiff challenging NCAA regulatory activity bears the “burden of 
showing that an agreement had anticompetitive effects on a particular 
market.”135  It explained: “The entire point of the Sherman Act is to protect 
competition in the commercial arena; without a commercial market, the 
goals of the Sherman Act have no place.”136 
In order to assert a viable section one claim, Penn State would be 
required to allege (and ultimately prove) that the disciplinary sanctions 
imposed by the Consent Decree reduce economic competition among NCAA 
member universities in a commercial market.137  This is a difficult burden to 
satisfy, particularly because the Consent Decree does not prohibit Penn State 
from playing regular season intercollegiate football games or appearing on 
television, which are commercial markets that produce entertainment 
products desired by consumers.138  Nor does it preclude Penn State from 
competing with other NCAA institutions in the markets for post-secondary 
education,139 Division I football players,140 or the sale of college-football-
 
 132.  Pennsylvania v. NCAA, No. 1:13-cv-00006, 2013 WL 2450291, at 14–15 (M.D. Pa. June 6, 
2013). 
 133.  Id. at *7 (“Contrary to the Third Circuit’s opinion in Smith, which distinguished between 
non-commercial and commercial activity for the purposes of applying the Sherman Act to 
Defendant’s regulatory activity, the Seventh Circuit held in Agnew that the Sherman Act ‘applies 
generally’ to Defendant’s actions.”). 
 134.  683 F.3d 328, 337 (7th Cir. 2012).  “In an area that is not obviously commercial, and thus 
where the Sherman Act’s application is not clearly apparent, we believe it is incumbent on the 
plaintiff to describe the rough contours of the relevant commercial market in which anticompetitive 
effects may be felt . . . .”  Id. at 345.  
 135.  Id. at 337. 
 136.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 137.  See id. at 335. 
 138.  See CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1. 
 139.  It would be very difficult to prove that the Consent Decree’s sanctions, rather than Penn 
State officials’ involvement in the Sandusky sexual child abuse scandal, are the proximate cause of 
any reduced ability of Penn State to engage in economic competition with other NCAA schools for 
students, faculty, and academic funding in the higher education market. 
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related apparel and memorabilia.141  Unless its financial effects were so 
severe that it prevented Penn State from fielding a college football team 
(which is not the case), the $60 million fine would not reduce economic 
competition between NCAA universities in any commercial market for 
college football or intercollegiate athletics.  Vacating Penn State’s football 
wins from 1998–2011 and the university’s five-year probationary period do 
not appear to restrain any commercial market.  However, the four-year ban 
on Penn State’s participation in post-season football games, if its team 
qualifies for a bowl game, may reduce economic competition among NCAA 
Division I FBS universities and restrain a commercial market.142 
If Penn State could satisfy its burden of showing that the Consent 
Decree is the product of an agreement among NCAA universities that has 
anticompetitive market effects,143 the rule of reason would require the 
NCAA to show that its disciplinary sanctions have a judicially recognized 
procompetitive justification such as maintaining competitive balance, 
academic integrity, or amateurism.144  It is difficult to see how these 
 
 140.  The four-year football scholarship reductions do not have the requisite commercial effect if 
they only adversely affect the on-field performance of Penn State’s football team in the short term.  
Even if the labor market for football student-athletes is a commercial market, Agnew, 683 F.3d at 
346–47, a collective reduction of sixty Penn State football scholarships during this period may have 
only a de minimus anticompetitive effect. In September 2013 the NCAA announced that because of 
“Penn State University’s continued progress toward ensuring athletics integrity,” it would be 
restoring its lost football scholarships to enable it to award the NCAA’s annual maximum of 25 
scholarships in 2015-16 and maximum of 85 total scholarships in 2016-17.  Press Release, NCAA, 
Executive Committee to gradually restore Penn State scholarships, available at  
http://www.ncaa.com/news/football/article/2013-09-24/executive-committee-gradually-restore-penn-
state-scholarships.  
 141.  See CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1. 
 142.  Worldwide Basketball and Sports Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(NCAA rule limiting the number of times Division I universities may participate in outside certified 
basketball tournaments “has some commercial impact insofar as it regulates games that constitute 
sources of revenue for both the member schools and the [p]romoters.”). The common law restraint of 
trade doctrine, which generally does not require pleading and proof that a relevant commercial 
market is restrained, provides an alternative theory for reducing the length of Penn State’s 
postseason ban if it is shown to be unreasonable in duration given the NCAA’s legitimate regulatory 
objectives.  For a general discussion of this legal doctrine and how it has been applied by U.S. courts 
in other contexts, see generally Stephen F. Ross, Principles of Antitrust Law at 12–20 (Foundation 
Press 1993).  If the common law restraint of trade law of a state other than Indiana is applied, 
potential Dormant Commerce Clause issues arise. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 143.  The common law restraint of trade doctrine, which generally does not require pleading and 
proof that a relevant commercial market is restrained, provides an alternative theory for potentially 
challenging the length of Penn State’s postseason ban. See supra note 142. 
 144.  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 113–20 (1984); Law v. NCAA, 
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sanctions relate to the preservation of amateurism or academic integrity.  
However, they arguably bear a reasonable relationship to the NCAA’s 
legitimate need to maintain competitive balance among its member 
universities if Penn State officials’ conduct in connection with Sandusky’s 
serial child abuse violated specific NCAA rules designed to achieve this 
objective, or their cover-up was intended to avoid bad publicity that would 
harm its football program.  The NCAA also might assert that these 
disciplinary sanctions have the procompetitive justification of maintaining 
the integrity of and public confidence in intercollegiate athletics, which was 
harmed because “the reverence for Penn State football permeated every level 
of the University community” and created an “imbalance of power” with 
results “antithetical to the model of intercollegiate athletics embedded in 
higher education.”145 
If the NCAA demonstrates that the Consent Decree has procompetitive 
effects, then Penn State must prove that its disciplinary sanctions are “not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate objectives or that those 
objectives can be achieved in a substantially less restrictive manner.”146  It is 
likely Penn State would assert that the Executive Committee’s usurpation of 
the NCAA’s traditional rules-enforcement process met this standard 
because, given the opportunity to defend itself, the Committee on Infractions 
may have determined that its conduct did not violate NCAA rules or may 
have imposed lesser sanctions if it did.  If both parties satisfy their respective 
burdens under the rule of reason, then the anticompetitive market effects of 
the Consent Decree and its procompetitive effects “must be weighed against 
each other in order to judge whether the challenged behavior is, on balance, 
reasonable.”147  In antitrust litigation it is always hard to predict how the fact 
finder will resolve this issue.  
Based on existing legal precedent, it is unlikely that Penn State could 
successfully plead and prove that the NCAA’s conduct violated section one 
of the Sherman Act.  Its primary difficulty would be proving that the terms 
of the Consent Decree have anticompetitive market effects, which is a 
significant hurdle that an antitrust plaintiff must surmount in challenging 
disciplinary sanctions imposed by a sports governing body.   
 
134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998).  
 145.  CONSENT DECREE, supra note 1, at 4. 
 146.  Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.  
 147.  Id.  
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V.  CONCLUSION 
The NCAA’s historically unprecedented imposition of draconian 
institutional disciplinary sanctions on Penn State for individual criminal and 
tortious conduct arising out of Gerald Sandusky’s serial sexual child abuse 
constitutes an unwarranted “rush to judgment” to demonstrate presidential 
control of intercollegiate athletics in response to other recent scandals 
involving high profile intercollegiate football programs.148  Although Penn 
State “agreed” to the Consent Decree’s terms, the NCAA’s coercive means 
violated the university’s contractual due process rights and the law of private 
associations.  The NCAA’s objectives of holding Penn State accountable for 
its leaders’ failure to take appropriate action to protect the safety and welfare 
of innocent children who were sexually abused on its campus and in 
connection with youth activities associated with its athletic program as well 
as changing the institutional culture that permitted it to occur is laudable and 
should be applauded.  Nevertheless, the NCAA should have respected and 
followed its well-established rules-enforcement process before disciplining 
Penn State.  It also should adopt proactive reforms requiring greater 
individual and institutional responsibility to take affirmative steps to protect 
the health, safety, and welfare of all persons exposed to known or 
foreseeable risks of harm by the operation of its athletics program, reforms 
that provide clear notice of specific action or inaction that violates NCAA 
rules and of potential sanctions. 
  
 
 148.  See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.  It has spawned Congressional introduction 
of the “National Collegiate Athletics Accountability Act,” co-sponsored by Rep. Charles W. Dent 
(R-Pa.).  Among other requirements, this proposed federal legislation would prohibit universities 
that receive federal funding from being a member of the NCAA unless: 1) it provides a mandated 
administrative hearing, with at least one appeal, and other due process procedures deemed necessary 
by the Secretary of Education; and 2) no sanctions begin until after the appeals process.  Ali Fogarty, 
Legislators introduce NCAA Accountability Act, STATE COLLEGE NEWS (August 2, 2013), available 
at http://www.statecollege.com/news/local-news/legislators-introduce-ncaa-accountability-act-13596 
66/; Jenna Johnson, Ohio, Penn. athletic scandals prompt lawmakers’ call for NCAA change, 
WASHINGTON POST (August 1, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ohio-
penn-athletic-scandals-prompt-lawmakers-call-for-ncaa-change/2013/08/01/aa21ef3e-facc-11e2-
8752-b41d7ed1f685_story.html.   
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